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Abstract
Background: Women and children suffer disproportionately in armed-conflicts. Since 2011, the protracted Syrian
crisis has fragmented the pre-existing healthcare system. Despite the massive health needs of women and children,
the delivery of key reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health and nutrition (RMNCAH&N)
interventions, and its underlying factors are not well-understood in Syria. Our objective was to document
intervention coverage indicators and their implementation challenges inside Syria during conflict.
Methods: We conducted 1) a desk review to extract RMNCAH&N intervention coverage indicators inside Syria
during the conflict; and 2) qualitative interviews with decision makers and health program implementers to explore
reasons behind provision/non-provision of RMNCAH&N interventions, and the rationale informing decisions,
priorities, collaborations and implementation. We attempt to validate findings by triangulating data from both
sources.
Results: Key findings showed that humanitarian organisations operating in Syria adopted a complex multi-hub
structure, and some resorted to remote management to improve accessibility to certain geographic areas. The
emergency response prioritised trauma care and infectious disease control. Yet, with time, humanitarian
organisations successfully advocated for prioritising maternal and child health and nutrition interventions given
evident needs. The volatile security context had implications on populations’ healthcare seeking behaviors, such as
women reportedly preferring home births, or requesting Caesarean-sections to reduce insecurity risks. Additional
findings were glaring data gaps and geographic variations in the availability of data on RMNCAH&N indicators.
Adaptations of the humanitarian response included task-shifting to overcome shortage in skilled healthcare workers
following their exodus, outreach activities to enhance access to RMNCAH&N services, and operating in
‘underground’ facilities to avoid risk of attacks.
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Conclusion: The case of Syria provides a unique perspective on creative ways of managing the humanitarian
response and delivering RMNCAH&N interventions, mainly in the multi-hub structure and use of remote
management, despite encountered challenges. The scarcity of RMNCAH&N data is a tremendous challenge for both
researchers and implementing agencies, as it limits accountability and monitoring, thus hindering the evaluation of
delivered interventions.
Keywords: Reproductive health, Maternal health, Child health, Nutrition, Health interventions, Coverage, Syria,
Armed conflict, Humanitarian crises
Background
Armed conflict and violence have grave direct and indir-
ect health implications for civilians, the majority of
whom are women and children [1, 2]. The collapse of
public services, health systems and social networks
places a disproportionate burden on the health of
women and children [1, 2], which can be further exacer-
bated when they are forcibly displaced from their homes
and communities.
The Syrian conflict started in March 2011 when a
popular uprising in the South of the country was met by
a security response that resulted in further unrest and
escalation within the country [3]. The ensuing deadly
war led to the division of the Syrian territory among
conflicting political factions, and the fragmentation of
the country’s governance between the Government of
Syria and opposition groups [4, 5]. The evolution of the
conflict has been marked by constant shifts in political
boundaries as a result of the volatile security context [6].
Prior to the crisis, Syria was classified as a middle-
income country, with a robust national health system led
by the public sector, with a growing private sector [7]
and little reliance on civil society organisations [8]. Na-
tional commitment contributed to nearly 30 years of
progress in health indicators; with Syria achieving 85
and 68% of its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
4 and 5 targets1 respectively by 2008 (data on pre-
conflict indicators are displayed in Additional File 1) [9,
10]. Since 2011, the protracted crisis, political
destabilization, targeting and destruction of healthcare
facilities, attacks on health workers, and an exodus of
well-trained health professionals have led to the partial
collapse and fragmentation of the healthcare system
[11–13]. The fracturing of the Syrian health system has
had detrimental effects on healthcare provision, and
considerable consequences on population health, includ-
ing an increased risk of infectious disease outbreaks [14]
and challenges in accessing maternal and child health in-
terventions [4].
With a population of around 21 million pre-conflict
[15], Syria witnessed massive waves of population
displacement. Currently, 6.2 million people are internally
displaced within Syria [16], and there are 5.4 million reg-
istered Syrian refugees in neighboring countries [17].
Considering the dynamic shifts in conflict lines, the
number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) increased
as Syrians were forced to move multiple times before
reaching a safe region [18]. The IDPs live in informal
settlements2 [16], and their health needs are exacerbated
by poor living conditions [5, 18], and their limited access
to humanitarian aid [4]. In 2018, an estimated 11.3 mil-
lion people in Syria were in need of humanitarian assist-
ance in health, of whom 1.3 million were children under
5 years of age [16]. The number of women of reproduct-
ive age (15–49 years) living in Syria in 2017 was esti-
mated to reach 3.3 million [19].
In light of the resulting humanitarian need, a large
number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
and United Nations (UN) agencies have established a
humanitarian response in Syria [6]. Given the territor-
ial and governmental fragmentation and insecurity, in
addition to managing the response from inside Syria,
humanitarian agencies have had to operate remotely
from neighboring countries, following the United Na-
tions Security Council (UNSC) resolution 21653
adopted in 2014 [6, 20]. As a consequence, the hu-
manitarian system adopted a complex structure which
consists of three official coordination hubs: Damascus
(Syria), Gaziantep (Turkey) and Amman (Jordan); and
one unofficial hub serving the North-East of the
country, all operating under the Whole of Syria
framework [6, 21] (See Fig. 1). Within these struc-
tures, UN agencies collaborated with various govern-
ing bodies in areas under different control groups,
such as the collaboration with the Syrian Ministry of
Health in government-controlled areas, which was
considered as a co-lead with WHO for the health
cluster in the Damascus hub; or with the Health Di-
rectorates established by local health networks with a
1MDG4: Reduce child mortality; MDG5: Improve maternal health
2Informal settlements consist of groups of tents/shelters established by
IDPs themselves
3This resolution allows UN agencies and their implementing partners
to deliver humanitarian assistance from neighboring countries using
approved border-crossings
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loose link to the interim ministry of health in oppos-
ition held areas [6, 22]. These collaborating bodies
would contribute to the development of yearly
Humanitarian Response Plans, based on regularly
conducted Humanitarian Needs Overviews [16, 23].
Considering the specific needs and vulnerabilities
of women and children during the Syrian conflict, it
is unclear whether the remaining healthcare system
supported by humanitarian interventions was able to
deliver key reproductive, maternal, newborn, child
and adolescent health and nutrition (RMNCAH&N)
interventions [24]. These services included, but were
not limited to, family planning, antenatal care
(ANC), skilled birth attendance (e.g. EmOC,
BEmOC, etc.), postnatal care (PNC) and newborn
care, promotion of immediate and exclusive breast-
feeding, and nutrition education and support [25–
28]. In a recent review, we reported declines in
coverage rates of certain key evidence-based inter-
ventions between January 2011 and December 2015
(e.g. measles immunization coverage among children
12–23 months decreased from 81.9% pre-conflict to
75% in 2013) [24]. The review also highlighted limi-
tations in the data available on the health of popu-
lations remaining in Syria, as the majority of
evidence focuses on Syrian refugees living in neigh-
boring countries [24, 29, 30].
To better inform RMNCAH&N interventions and
respond to women and children’s health needs in
conflict, it is important to understand how the
Fig. 1 Hubs coordinating the humanitarian response in Syria
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multiplicity of actors worked to deliver key interven-
tions, what barriers were faced in the delivery of
these interventions, and ways in which these barriers
were overcome. As part of a multi-country study co-
ordinated by the BRANCH4 Consortium and focused
on RMNCAH&N in 10 conflict-affected countries
(Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South
Sudan, Syria, Yemen) [31] this research aimed to
document the provision and coverage of
RMNCAH&N interventions and explore the factors
that influenced their implementation in Syria during
the crisis. Ultimately, our purpose was to inform
practices and policies to improve health service deliv-
ery and health outcomes for women, children and ad-
olescents, and to derive potential lessons learned for
other conflict settings.
Methods
In order to achieve these objectives, this study
adapted a common protocol developed for all case
studies [31]. We used two main data sources: (1) an
updated desk review of DeJong et al. [24] from which
quantitative data on coverage indicators were ex-
tracted; and (2) qualitative key informant interviews
with decision-makers and health program implemen-
ters. The approach was both exploratory and explana-
tory; each data source was used to generate new
evidence and both sources were triangulated in an at-
tempt to validate findings. For example, the results of
the desk review were concurrently shared with the
qualitative research team to refine probes for the
topic guide and ask for clarifications from respon-
dents about specific coverage indicators during the
key informant interviews. Findings from the desk re-
view were also iteratively used to complement the
qualitative findings.
Desk review
We conducted a desk review that built on the above-
mentioned previously conducted review [24], and used
the same search strategy to systematically update
numbers on RMNCAH&N coverage indicators for
populations living in Syria. The objective of the desk
review was to document coverage indicators during
the 2011–2018 period of the conflict in comparison
to pre-conflict baseline data when available. This was
achieved by merging the findings of the first review
(January 2011 to December 2015) with those of the
updated search (January 2015 to March 2018), to
which we added search terms for adolescents. We
searched the same published and grey literature data-
bases including but not limited to Medline, PubMed,
Relief Web, WHO EMRO websites [24] (key words,
search strategy and inclusion/exclusion criteria are de-
tailed in Additional File 2).
We further explored the World Health Organisation
(WHO) vaccine-preventable diseases monitoring system
[32], from which we extracted annual immunization
coverage estimates. We included all national estimates
that present coverage rates published between 2010 and
2017. Additionally, we reviewed all published Health Re-
sources and service Availability Mapping System (HeR-
AMS) reports, available only since 2014 [33], from
which we extracted facility-level monthly Caesarean-
section (C-section) rates in the included public facilities,
between January 2014 and March 2018, with the excep-
tion of the year 2016 for which reports were not
accessible.
We imported all retrieved documents into End-
Note reference manager [34] and removed dupli-
cate records. We included original research studies
and reports that described relevant RMNCAH&N
coverage indicators among the Syrian population
residing in Syria, and documents reporting on in-
terventions delivered and factors affecting their im-
plementation during the Syrian conflict. Two
researchers conducted title and abstract screening
followed by full-text screening, independently. Dis-
agreements were discussed among and resolved by
the two reviewers, and with a third independent re-
searcher if needed.
We performed a full-text review of publications that
met the eligibility criteria, and extracted relevant data
using a standardized KoboToolbox [35] data entry
form. Variables that allowed quality assessment (in-
cluding research design, sampling strategy and sample
size, among others; see Additional File 1, Table S1)
were abstracted when available in addition to the
relevant indicators, interventions implemented, and
factors affecting implementation. The screening flow-
charts of the published and grey literature reviews are
presented in Fig. 2.
The newly extracted indicators from the updated re-
view were merged with the findings of the initial re-
view and summarized in Additional File 1 (Table S2,
S3 and S4) by year and geographic region. We
mapped the availability/accessibility of RMNCAH&N
indicators by geographic region using ArcGIS [36].
Where the data allowed, periodic trends in certain
coverage indicators were explored and plotted in the
form of line and area charts.4Bridging Research & Action in Conflict Settings for the Health of
Women & Children
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Key informant interviews
We conducted semi-structured interviews between July
and November 2018. We identified the major organisa-
tions within the humanitarian emergency response in
Syria from the Humanitarian Response in the Whole of
Syria. Contact details of cluster and sector leaders were
publicly available. A preliminary list of all potential
stakeholders (decision makers and health program im-
plementers) was put together and expanded using the
snowball technique. We approached 41 potential partici-
pants of whom 16 (40%) refused or did not respond, and
25 provided informed consent across the Whole of Syria
and the Damascus, Gaziantep and Amman hubs. We
sought key informants from UN organisations, inter-
national and local NGOs, local health authorities and ac-
ademics (Table 1).
Questions to study participants related to the spe-
cific delivery of interventions, the role of the repre-
sented organisations with respect to the provision of
RMNCAH&N interventions, reasons behind
provision/non-provision of certain interventions, ra-
tionale informing the decisions, priorities, collabora-
tions and implementation-related questions (Interview
guides available in Additional File 3). Only three in-
terviews were held face-to-face while the rest were
conducted through telephone/Skype calls, and 16 in-
terviews were conducted in English while the rest
were in Arabic. All interviews were transcribed verba-
tim, Arabic ones were transcribed in Arabic then
translated to English and all transcripts were coded
by two team members independently using Dedoose
8.1.8 [37].
Fig. 2 Desk review screening flowcharts
Table 1 Key informants by hub and agency type
Whole of Syria Damascus hub Jordan hub Turkey hub Total
UN agency 4 3 1 2 10
International NGO 1 1 5 2 9
Local NGO 1 3 4
Local health authorities 1 1
Academia 1 1
Total 5 5 7 8 25
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We analyzed the transcripts of interviews using the
latent content analysis approach [38]. This involved
an initial reading of interview transcripts from which
we developed a preliminary list of key ideas and re-
current themes. Considering the topic guide ques-
tions and themes that emerged, we organised the
data into categories and identified relationships
among and between categories, which allowed us to
understand explanatory patterns. Quotes included in
the results section have not been attributed to type
or location of organisations for reasons of
confidentiality.
Results
The humanitarian architecture in the Syrian conflict
The nature of the Syrian conflict has shaped the hu-
manitarian response; as the conflict fragmented terri-
tories across different governing authorities, it was
difficult for the response to have a unified coordin-
ation approach. This resulted in a complex coordin-
ation and implementation structure under what is
termed “The Whole of Syria Approach”. Within this
structure, WHO led the health sector/cluster5, with
reproductive health being co-led by United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), and with the United Na-
tions Children’s Fund (UNICEF) leading the nutri-
tion sector/cluster. In Damascus, these structures
were co-managed with the Ministry of Health
(MoH).
“[In other conflict settings…] there is only one coord-
inator. In Syria, there are four hubs, and in addition,
one of those hubs, the Damascus one, also has three
sub-offices where there is also coordination taking
place. So in this case, there is quite a multi-layered
approach to the coordination.” (R11).
The UN cluster approach was activated at different
times in different geographical regions starting in
Damascus as sector coordination in January 2013 [39]
and accommodating the new hubs following the UNSC
resolution 2165 [20] with Gaziantep in late 2014 and
Amman in late 2015. One key informant criticized the
delayed establishment of the coordination mechanisms
especially in the North.
“If I were to […] highlight […] how we could have
done things differently, the fact that the cluster
system was not established until way late into the
response, is the failing of the cluster system itself.”
(R14).
The presence of different coordinating hubs was re-
ported to cause difficulties in having a harmonized ap-
proach and aligned standards across the four hubs.
These were reported to be partly due to the distinct ap-
proaches of the NGO/UN-led system versus the existing
national system or those established by other governing
bodies (temporary government or the Kurdish
administration).
“It’s very hard to align them [the different ap-
proaches] because you’re trying to mix a national
system with an approach that’s led by NGOs from
different sides.” (R06).
Several representatives, some of whom were
of implementing agencies, reported facing restrictions
imposed by governing entities as to where they could
operate. Organisations operating in government-
controlled areas are required to be registered in the
country and to work through locally registered orga-
nisations such as the Syrian Arab Red Crescent
(SARC) and are not allowed to be operational in non-
government-controlled areas.
To overcome restricted access to non-government-
controlled areas in the North and the South, the
humanitarian actors adopted a remote management
strategy from the Gaziantep and Amman hubs, which
had to be agile by continuously adapting to the pre-
vailing political and security situations affecting the
ability to cross borders. Adopted strategies ranged
from: i) direct implementation with remote manage-
ment, whereby organisations were registered and
based outside Syria, but sent staff across borders to
deliver services; to ii) sub-contracting local NGOs
with regular monitoring, and communication through
telephone, Skype calls, or visits to Gaziantep or
Amman; and iii) supporting local organisations with
funding and supplies with no mechanisms to monitor
the quality of delivered services.
“We have five different types of remote programming
that we can run. Right now, the remote program you
can run inside Syria is the […] one that we don’t
want: […] it’s just dumping money with no quality
assurance […]” (R19).
The volatility and dynamism of the political situ-
ation in Syria have led to constant shifts in control
affecting the sustainability of both operations and
coordination.
5The term “sector” refers to discrete technical areas of humanitarian
action in Syria following the Cluster approach but where the
Government is co-managing the coordination. In non-government-
controlled areas, Clusters report to the Humanitarian Coordinator
without governmental involvement.
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“When you look at the maps now, you will see the
changes in conflict lines, so when a service was pro-
vided by a particular […] service provider, whether
private, public, or NGO at the time, and there is a
shift in control lines, [service provision] either stops
or completely disappears until this is revitalized to a
public facility or a private facility that provides ser-
vices [by organisations on the other side of the con-
flict]” (R06).
Decision making process
Decision making in the Syrian conflict was reported
to follow the standard Humanitarian Program Cycle
– a process that includes identifying needs, plan-
ning activities, implementation, and monitoring and
evaluation on a quarterly and annual basis [40].
This process was reported to be centralized at the
Whole of Syria coordination level, with the engage-
ment of the various sectors and working groups
within each hub. Planning is coordinated with local
authorities, and in the Damascus hub, the MoH was
reported to be co-leading the health and nutrition
responses.
Although no data from the desk review could sup-
port this finding, the majority of key informants
emphasised that the prioritisation of geographical
areas of operations is independent of political govern-
ance over the area, and mainly driven by the magni-
tude of identified needs and the degree of
vulnerability of the concerned population [41]6.
“All of our interventions [are] need-based, so we are
area blind, we are control blind, we are government
blind, and we don’t factor that [in] when we assess
the needs.” (R10).
The massive waves of internal displacement to areas of
operations led to constant fluctuations in population size
and needs, therefore interfering with the implementation
of planned services, and creating a need to monitor the
situation on a regular basis (Box 1).
Restricted access was reported by several key infor-
mants as one of the challenges to conducting needs as-
sessments and delivering health and nutrition
interventions in hard-to-reach areas where the security
situation was most severe.
“You have to coordinate locally and seek approvals
of the security apparatus and the system that works.
It’s a bit challenging, you have to work with [the-
se]authorities, in identifying the needs and seeking
approval [to access] those areas.” (R12).
Humanitarian organisations engaged in successful
negotiation and coordination efforts with local au-
thorities allowing them to gain access to hard-to-
reach locations.
“There was a small Polio outbreak in Deir-ez-Zor,
which is a marginal area in the North East, [so]
there had to be negotiation with [opposition par-
ties] to actually run a Polio [vaccination] cam-
paign in that area. And it was the Ministry [of
health] who accepted as well. […] It was a very
strong negotiation to make sure that the response
was implemented, which I think was an amazing
success story” (R06).
In addition to population needs, and according to
some key informants, intervention delivery was reported
to depend upon partners’ technical and financial capaci-
ties to implement, whereby a decision maker stated to
have formally evaluated these capacities through the
“Organisation Capacity Assessment”.
“[Sector leads] highlight all priorities, and then we
see who’s willing to take what, depending on their
capacity […], sometimes we just go to a certain
partner because we know that this partner has
the capacity to do this. And sometimes they would
take the offer […] and sometimes they just de-
cline.” (R01).
It was reported that the entire civil society system
in Syria faces operational challenges. Pre-existing
NGOs were not accustomed to functioning in emer-
gency circumstances, as opposed to other contexts at
the international level that had suffered from conflict,
and where the humanitarian response has existed for
decades.
“I believe, [in other settings] we’ve been having emer-
gencies since existence began, so the NGO capacity
has been on-going for the last 25-30 or 40 years, but
Syria was pretty much a stable country until this
particular [conflict]. So, the issue of having NGOs
and how NGOs are run, the whole operations, is also
[challenging], so there is a limit to what you can ex-
pect.” (R02).
Nevertheless, a number of operating partners in Syria
reported that they compensated for the shortage in cap-
acities by complementing each other’s activities on
6The magnitude of needs and vulnerability level in a given area is
measured using a severity score, which is a composite needs index,
with scores ranging from 0 to 6, used for priority setting and planning
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certain occasions, thus ensuring the implementation of
essential programs.
“For example, [if] we have nutrition surveillance and
IYCF [program capacity], and there is [an]other
partner [that] can provide surveillance in this [geo-
graphic] area, […] then we will only provide IYCF.
The full package is to provide both, but we can de-
pend on other partners.” (R09).
The Humanitarian Response Plan also depended on
the availability of funds and their allocation. In some in-
stances, donors’ political agendas were reported to influ-
ence access and intervention delivery to certain
geographic locations.
“[Donor X] will not agree to carry out an inter-
vention in specific areas where some specific
groups are in control. By these groups, I mean the
radical ones. However, the civilians there are in
need […] but no intervention can be carried out.”
(R21).
Similarly, and as the crisis progressed, there was a re-
ported shift from “un-earmarked” funding to donors en-
forcing restrictions on the types of funded activities,
which influenced the spectrum of available services. For
example, one donor had a constraint on procuring con-
traceptives, which hampered the provision of family
planning services.
“[Donors] influence the agenda because they have
the money. If they don’t want to support or fund
something, this is not going to happen even if you ad-
vocate for that thing for a zillion year.” (R01).
Moreover, donor fatigue and the multiple competing
crises in the world over a single pool of financial re-
sources have contributed to a reported shortage in allo-
cated funds. The health and nutrition responses had to
adapt by compromising certain planned interventions or
prioritising certain ones over others. Resource limita-
tions were cited to influence, for example, the ability to
provide neonatal intensive care.
“We also focused on [newborn intensive care], but,
[due to] the lack of resources and funding, we could
not treat it as a top priority” (R15).
Factors that influenced intervention coverage and
adaptations
Three key factors were identified as influencing
RMNCAH&N intervention delivery, coverage and adap-
tations in interventions: (1) prioritisation (or the lack of
thereof) of RMNCAH&N interventions, (2) the security
situation, which influenced health seeking behaviors of
populations in this context, and (3) a mismatch between
interventions provided by the humanitarian response
and national in-country practices existing pre-conflict.
Prioritisation (or the lack of prioritisation) of RMNCAH&N
interventions
As the crisis progressed and needs intensified, service
prioritisation by humanitarian actors was reported to in-
fluence the types of interventions delivered and their
coverage. Child vaccination was delivered as one of the
first-line interventions with the MoH leading the re-
sponse from Damascus, but differences in geographical
coverage remained (see Box 2). The early response also
focused on injury care and providing food and shelter.
However, humanitarian agencies were able to success-
fully advocate for prioritisation of reproductive and ma-
ternal healthcare, such as antenatal, delivery and
postnatal care based on evident needs. Family planning
was reported to have been overlooked in the early
phases of the response, and took time to be re-
established, with certain reported geographic
discrepancies.
“Family planning services were not very strong in the
public facilities in the first place. […] Before the cri-
sis [family planning] was one of the […] mandates of
an NGO that had very strong reach […], I don’t
think there was a focus on family planning in the
emergency mode […]. [The response] took some time
to re-establish […] When you have a facility in a lo-
cation, it might have stopped for a while, it might
have changed locations, your staff might have com-
pletely disappeared; […] [family planning services]
slowly over time sort of revitalized” (R06).
Delays in establishing family planning services were
also due to certain donors refusing to fund the service,
and governing authorities restricting service delivery in
certain geographic areas. Whereas in other areas, donors
pushed for family planning programs.
It appears that, as was the case for family planning,
services that were reportedly not strongly institutional-
ized in the public sector pre-conflict were also those that
were not prioritised in the emergency humanitarian re-
sponse. Another example is that of adolescent-specific
services, which remained lacking despite the presence of
early marriage in Syria and the recognized need to there-
fore target this age group.
“Based on what we’ve seen, we tried to initiate some
kind of messaging around the dangers of early preg-
nancy, and delaying the age of marriage, but we’re
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not spanning the full spectrum of adolescent SRH at
the moment” (R14).
A few key informants also reported that the low preva-
lence of malnutrition (Additional File 1, Table S4), in
addition to the lack of data and evidence on infant and
young child feeding (IYCF) indicators contributed to
delaying the nutrition response.
Security influenced health seeking behaviors
As coverage rates of certain interventions decreased
during the conflict (e.g. contraceptive prevalence
rate), and data on others were completely lacking
(e.g. ANC 4+ (at least four antenatal care visits) and
PNC) (Additional File 1, Table S2), humanitarian
agencies implemented outreach and awareness rais-
ing activities to promote and extend the availability
of services to beneficiaries. Despite these efforts, in-
security limited women’s movement and populations
feared violent attacks, including attacks on health-
care facilities.
“Although we are offering all these services [safe
delivery] at the hospitals and comprehensive pri-
mary health centers, the security issue is limiting
pregnant women’s access to the centers in fear of
being attacked. Because […] there is a systematic
targeting of health centers and hospitals including
obstetric and women hospitals. […] This means
that there’s still a high proportion of home births
that we cannot determine. Thus, we are imple-
menting something called a community midwives
[program].” (R18).
The community midwives program, which was re-
ported to be implemented in the Northwest, given Syr-
ian women’s reported preference for home births,
ensured skilled birth attendance whereby birth registra-
tion was reported to be conditional upon a trained mid-
wife’s signature of required paperwork. Midwives were
also trained to refer complicated deliveries to hospitals;
this was one of the factors contributing to the increasing
facility-level C-section rate in Syria during the conflict,
while the population-level indicator remained more-or-
less constant based on the findings of the desk review
(see Box 3 for additional details).
A mismatch between humanitarian interventions and
previously existing practices
Several respondents referred to a mismatch between in-
terventions proposed by humanitarian agencies and pre-
viously existing national programs and practices. In
addition to the newly-introduced community outreach
activities mentioned above, other examples include pro-
curement of certain vaccines such as the pneumococcal
conjugate vaccine antigen, which proved to be difficult
as it is not part of the national Expanded Program on
Immunization (EPI) schedule in Syria [42]. Several key
informants also stated that the health and nutrition re-
sponses focused on the delivery of the essential, life-
saving, cost-effective primary healthcare packages, such
as the Minimum Initial Service Package (MISP), Inte-
grated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) which
existed previously in Syria since 2000 [43], and nutrition
surveillance. However, this modality of delivering health-
care was resisted by Syrian beneficiaries at first due to
the reported pre-conflict pattern of by-passing primary
services and specialist visits being the first point of
contact.
“When we started off, […] it was a bit difficult to
convince the general populations to seek services at
primary healthcare facilities. This is because their
mindset was that ‘when I get sick, I go to a hospital
and I see a specialist.’ […] Over the last five years or
so, I guess that mindset has changed a little, and the
fact that primary healthcare is still quality health-
care, that concept has slowly sunk in.” (R14).
The humanitarian response did, however, evolve over
time, and as priorities were being met there was more
opportunity to deliver second- and third-line interven-
tions. For example, within the nutrition sector in
Damascus, it was described how once programs for the
treatment of acute malnutrition were well-established,
organisations were then able to move to supporting the
baby-friendly hospital initiative. Furthermore, few key in-
formants explained that actors started to address issues
related to quality of care later on during the crisis.
“At the beginning, […] you would go and provide
life-saving activities depending on how many benefi-
ciaries you served. Now, it’s different. You have to
identify exactly what the activities are that you want
to provide based on a needs assessment, […] what
protocol you want to apply, and what’s the indicator
that will reflect the impact of your intervention. So
this way we add more quality to the intervention.”
(R09).
Factors that influenced the modality of service delivery
and adaptations
Pre-conflict Syria: a middle-income country with existing
health capacities
Pre-conflict Syria was a middle-income country with ad-
equate healthcare delivery capacities, and few key infor-
mants highlighted the importance and need to adapt
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humanitarian intervention to make use of pre-conflict
skilled capacities.
“I think that [the] Syria crisis has challenged the hu-
manitarian community, […] Syria was a middle-
income country, [while] the humanitarian commu-
nity is mostly used to low-income countries. So, we
cannot just say OK this is what we’ve done in other
emergencies and this is what we do in Syria. […] We
need to think more creatively and adapt [better] to
the local context because we have capacities in
Syria.” (R16).
“Paediatricians are competent, and they have de-
grees. You cannot come and tell them to go back to
the level of IMCI. […] The situation here prior to
2011 was advanced compared to other countries
that have emergency zones…” (R18).
The health infrastructure did, however, partially col-
lapse and the humanitarian response then built on the
previously existing infrastructure by rehabilitating pri-
mary and secondary healthcare facilities, supporting
them financially or through in-kind assistance, and/or
recruiting staff in order to ensure free access to services
by populations in catchment areas.
Shortage in specialized healthcare providers
The conflict also led to a large exodus of skilled
healthcare providers, which necessitated a task-
shifting strategy. This was achieved by training gen-
eral practitioners, surgeons, nurses and midwives to
fill the gap in specialized healthcare workers
(mainly obstetricians/gynaecologists), instead of
recruiting non-local healthcare professionals (Box 2).
However, the quality and efficacy of the capacity
building was reported to be questionable by their
initiators themselves in the context of remote man-
agement, as training was conducted through phone
or Skype calls with limited possibility for hands-on
applications.
“[Health workers] just received a bunch of scattered,
random trainings from different organisations, and
they became psychosocial workers. It happened also
in nursing, midwifery and other specialties, and this
was another challenge we faced in terms of confirm-
ing credentials of staff” (R01).
Teams of healthcare staff were also required to rotate
amongst different facilities to fill the human resource
gap.
Implementing organisations faced difficulties in
recruiting skilled female practitioners, such as
gynaecologists, pediatricians (particularly among rural
women) and nutrition specialists, who were reported
to be preferred by female service users. This was es-
pecially true in the nutrition sector/cluster where the
modality of service delivery entailed household visits;
this could have been due to security concerns or cul-
tural norms.
“The majority of the interventions they were plan-
ning to conduct [in the nutrition sector] consisted
of household visits and day visits. […] People
would not let [young men] into their houses since,
during the day, there are only women in the
house.” (R08).
The challenge of recruiting skilled female practitioners
was further exacerbated by the preference of trained
health workers to practice in large cities.
“It’s very difficult to find a pediatrician. They usu-
ally want to stay within the larger cities, and to have
their own private practices instead of work with an
NGO in a camp setting.” (R14).
Displacement of populations
The massive waves of internal displacement of popula-
tions also led to interruptions in the continuity of care
and follow-up visits for displaced beneficiaries.
“[Displacement] is interrupting the [continuity] of
services. It is actually fragments of activities happen-
ing in different places, in different times, by different
people” (R10).
IDPs might not always be aware of the facilities
where they can seek health services. Thus, mobile
units were activated to respond to this need. Mobile
health teams provide basic RMNCH&N services and
consultations to IDP sites and hard-to-reach areas
and are considered entry points for any needed refer-
ral to other primary or secondary care levels. These
were complemented by “convoys”, which are mainly
used to provide one-off services such as the distribu-
tion of reproductive health kits or nutrition
supplements.
To access hard-to-reach areas, community outreach
and awareness raising activities were conducted.
“The gap of that system was in the hard-to-reach
areas because we couldn’t apply the same method,
so it was more of outreach, you had to try to make
contact with people inside those blocked areas.”
(R06).
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“I will tell you about one specific […] hard-to-reach
area that we supported. We send them the trucks of
the drugs, at night with the car’s and the truck’s
lights off. The truck moves slowly in order not to pro-
duce any sound.” (R21).
Procurement restrictions
While key informants did not report concerns over stock
availability of reproductive health related items, there
were reported restrictions on procuring certain supplies.
Thus, implementing agencies had to use commodities
available in the local market despite their uncertainty re-
garding the quality of local supplies.
“[There were] several restricted items, […] mainly the
ketamine, which had direct influence on reproductive
health. This is an anesthetic, […] and it’s preferred in
surgeries and maybe caesarean sections, so with high
rates of C-sections that we had in the South, […]
mostly if [ketamine is] available, it’s from the local
black market with very questionable quality.” (R01).
Few key informants also reported that the purchasing
process was too lengthy and interfered with the ability to
provide urgently needed services. To overcome the bur-
eaucratic procurement process, some UN agencies were
asking implementing partners to purchase supplies since
“[they] have a little bit of flexibility; [their process] is fas-
ter than ours” (R02).
Attacks on healthcare facilities
Targeting of healthcare facilities and ambulances and kid-
napping of healthcare workers was reported across all hubs
as a challenge. Many implementing partners developed pa-
tient evacuation plans and contingency plans in case of at-
tacks on healthcare (e.g. operating in secondary locations,
service decentralization, and fortification of health facil-
ities). On the other hand, some facilities completely re-
fused the support of NGOs as receiving NGO support was
perceived to increase the facilities’ risk of being attacked.
The choice of health facilities by implementers was
also reported to depend on their locations to minimize
the security risks on populations attending the facilities.
Humanitarian actors mostly chose small size health facil-
ities, or “underground, or secured, fortified facilities” to
mitigate the risk of targeting, and to prioritise the safety
of patients and health staff.
“One of the considerations for where [to open a facil-
ity] has always been that we have specifically looked
at facilities that were not at direct risk of being close
to […] a military output or something like that
where the population coming to the facility would be
at risk.” (R14).
Box 1 – RMNCAH&N data availability
In the setting of Syria in conflict, data collection, reporting and
data availability are complicated processes. Political constraints
limit the scope and detail of information that can be reported
and shared by the health system and humanitarian actors. Our
desk review and interviews reveal glaring gaps in data on
certain RMNCAH&N indicators that could be the result of either
lack of data or issues with data sharing. Examples include data
on maternal mortality ratio, proportion of women attending 4
or more ANC visits, proportion of women accessing PNC,
prevalence of low birthweight among newborns and indicators
related to adolescent health.
Certain key informants perceived these gaps to be the result of
the absence of a “unified health information system” in the
country; non-compliance in reporting from implementing
partners; and difficulties in conducting population-level
assessments and surveys given the security situation and remote
management.
“Here, we have not put [the surveillance of maternal deaths] in
place, […] and the reason [for that] is because of the remote
[management], [I] could not go on the ground, so I cannot work
with audit teams so that they work in a proper manner, and I felt
that there was too high a risk of damage, of harm, in setting such
a team without training them before.” (R07).
In addition, similarly to the findings of DeJong et al.’s review,
data on certain indicators were not accessible to the research
team although they were known to be available [24]. According
to several key informants, this is the result of organisational
policies that restrict data-sharing, and the nature of the
assessments, which are usually internal and performed to inform
planning and therefore there is a reluctance to share them.
Similarly, while a strong health monitoring system is in place in
public Syrian health facilities (HeRAMS), access to the raw data is
limited, and only reported aggregate measures could be used.
Moreover, the value of such a system is constrained, as it cannot
be used to generate population level indicators, since the
healthcare facilities’ catchment population cannot be reliably
estimated nor disaggregated by age and gender, especially
considering the extremely dynamic context [6, 44].
Even when data are available, their validity, quality, and
representativeness cannot be ascertained. One key informant
highlighted how the dynamic nature of the context – both in
terms of population displacement and frequency of armed
conflict events – reduces the validity of the data over a long
period, particularly considering the ever-changing needs.
Furthermore, data quality was reported to be threatened by the
remote modality of operations.
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“At the end of the day, whatever data we receive, […] we don’t
have any method to validate this data, […] we always have this
kind of leap of faith, so no matter what kinds of measures we take
in place, at the end there is a blind space […]” (R01).
In an attempt to adapt to the security constraints, agencies
were reported to be using unconventional methods to collect
quantitative data, such as conducting rapid appraisals with local
community members. Although the reliability of these
assessments and the resulting data quality are uncertain, they
remain a feasible option for obtaining information in such a
current volatile context [6]. Yet, this led to reported indicators
not being consistently defined in published reports/papers, and
not being consistent with internationally agreed upon
definitions (e.g. immunization coverage measured in different
age groups, or different dosages; reporting crude numbers of
those who received the service instead of proportions;
Additional File 1).
Map 1 of Fig. 3 displays the number of RMNCAH&N indicators
(of those listed in Additional File 4) collected from the desk
review by geographic area, whereas Map 2 displays populated
areas in Syria as per the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) [45]. These
highlight the fact that there are several densely populated
Syrian territories on which RMNCAH&N data were not
accessible/available in the published and grey literature. Key
informants additionally reported that published indicators are
not nationally representative as the humanitarian response does
not report on government-controlled areas.
“Let’s not forget that in vast areas, the health system is still intact,
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Higher Education… so we’re not
reporting what’s happening all over health, all over Syria, by
everyone” (R10).
Box 2 – Immunization
The partial collapse of the healthcare system during the conflict led
to disruptions in the vaccination schedule, and coverage rates
decreased with time (Fig. 4), leading to the re-emergence of Polio in
2013 [49]. However, the national communicable disease surveillance
system was strengthened during the war, as the MoH, supported by
WHO, established an Early Warning Alert and Response System
(EWARS) [50]. Together with Early Warning Alert and Response
Network (EWARN), which was functional in opposition-controlled
areas, surveillance was successfully maintained and able to detect
and control multiple outbreaks, including Polio [51]. Throughout the
conflict, the Syrian MoH was leading the immunization response in
Damascus and the surrounding government-controlled areas, as
well as in the South where humanitarian agencies would report
gaps in coverage to MoH teams. On the other hand, in Northern
non-government-controlled areas the Syria Immunization Group has
coordinated the immunization response since 2015.
Figure 4 displays trends in official immunization coverage rates
across Syria from 2010 to 2017 for measles and DTP [48]. As the
response evolved from supporting immunization campaigns to
strengthening the routine immunization program, rates increased to
over 70% coverage with time; yet they remain suboptimal due in
part to gaps in resources, and inconsistencies in providing services.
The result is that in certain areas coverage of the first dose remains
higher than coverage of subsequent doses (Fig. 4).
“The message is not that no vaccinations happened or that there is a
huge pool of unimmunized children, but that there are under-immunized
kids, who are just off schedule because of war disruption” (R01).
In South Syria, there were evident geographical discrepancies
regarding antigen-specific coverage rates. Data were available
for Dar’a and Quneitra at two time points [46, 47]. While East
Dar’a had higher coverage of the DTP vaccine, which is
administered through routine immunization, it had lower rates
of the measles antigen, compared to West Dara’a and Quneitra.
This was attributed to the different access/security situations in
these two regions, which led to adopting different modalities of
vaccination provision. In East Dar’a, there was ongoing
communication with the MoH, and the EPI was provided in
public vaccination centers. However, this was not the case in
West Dar’a/Quneitra, where humanitarian agencies conducted
two cross-border measles and polio immunization campaigns to
this region in 2015 and 2016. It was also mentioned that the
small population size in Quneitra kept it epidemic-free.
“It had so many fewer people that, your pockets of under-
immunized kids are probably smaller than even one large town in
the whole governorate” (R01).
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Fig. 3 Maps of RMNCAH&N indicators by geographic area and populated places
Fig. 4 Measles and DTP vaccination coverage rates across Syria in
West Dar’a/Quneitra [46], East Dar’a [47], as compared to national
WHO-UNICEF data [48], from 2010 to 2017
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Box 3 – Delivery care and caesarean-sections
The availability and modality of emergency obstetric care varies
across Syrian territories. In regions where Comprehensive
Emergency Obstetric Care (CEmOC) is available and where the
security situation is relatively stable, caesarean sections (C-
sections) are commonly performed, to the extent that the
operation was perceived as a “habit, a trend, more than really it
should have been, more than the necessary” in certain regions
(R06).
In fact, there was consensus among key informants from all
hubs that the proportion of deliveries by C-section increased
during the conflict. Key informants from the South reported
rates reaching an average of 40% at facility level, while those
based in Damascus reported a rate of 80% in the private sector.
These rates were also reported to fluctuate across areas ranging
from 10% in North-East Syria to around 48% in Hama. Figure 5
shows the evolution of C-section rates at public health facilities
reporting to HeRAMS over time, both on the national level and
in five selected Syrian governorates (Lattakia, Damascus, Dar’a, Al
Hassakeh and Aleppo), in addition to population-level estimates
retrieved through the desk review (Dar’a and Aleppo), and
national pre-conflict population-level C-section rate [55]. The
graph on Damascus also includes data from Dar-Al-Tawlid, a
public maternity hospital [52].
Several key informants reported numbers based on situation
assessments they contributed to or on anecdotal knowledge,
and these reported C-section rates were aligned with numbers
in Fig. 5. On the other hand, population level estimates of C-
section rates are lower given the high proportion of home
deliveries, which range from 13% in Aleppo and Idleb [53] to
29% in Eastern Dar’a in 2017 [54].
“Cases that do come to hospitals are those that require a C-section
because this can only be performed at the hospital” (R18).
Additionally, the security situation and the targeted attacks on
healthcare facilities have pushed women to opt for a scheduled
C-section. One study in 2017 has shown a significant positive
association between war events (explosions and clashes) and
the number of C-sections [56].
“Women would show up and say: ‘I want a C-section now because
I don’t want to stay in hospital […] I am afraid it’s going to get
attacked’, and so why would I [the woman] sit here in labor for 20
hours and give 20 hours of vulnerability to an attack?’” (R01).
Moreover, four key informants noted that high C-section rates
can be attributed to healthcare providers’ interests in time
management and financial gain, particularly among those who
would refer patients to their private clinics.
“Physicians and obstetrics/gynecology specialists become more, ‘ok
let me try to make sure that I have my time organised’ […]
doctors are no longer patient. For some of them, not for everyone,
this has unfortunately become a commercial process.” (R13).
Following the exodus of skilled obstetricians/gynecologists, task
shifting of delivery care to surgeons has also contributed to the
increase in C-sections, since “a surgeon is not an obstetrician, so
for them the standard of care is ‘the best, the safest, […] thing for
me to possibly do is to give a woman a C-section, cut and go’”
(R01).
Few key informants also reported that since before the conflict,
Syrian women have preferred seeking care at hospitals instead
of delivering at primary healthcare centers. This is in line with
the findings of Bashour et al. which show that most Syrian
women preferred to give birth at hospitals because they
perceived it to be safer than home births [57]. Some key
informants also pointed out that women may choose to
undergo a C-section, a procedure that could lead to increase
the rates of potentially dangerous repeat C-sections in the
future, instead of a normal birth. In Lebanon for example, 57%
of C-sections among Syrian refugees were attributed to repeat
C-sections during the first half of 2013 [58].
Nonetheless, in 2018, efforts started to be put in place to reduce
C-section rates within Syria, including by the MoH and
professional bodies who are leading discussions on this practice
and its implications. Other activities involve advocating for safe
and rational delivery care among implementing partners and
raising awareness among beneficiaries to encourage normal
delivery. However, achieving this target was perceived to be
complicated and challenged by the lack of time and remote
management.
Discussion
Before the conflict, Syria was covered by an accessible
and extensive public healthcare system, in addition to a
medicalized pattern of care with frequent recourse to
specialist care. As the war occurred with its shifting con-
trol lines, high-level decision making, the healthcare sys-
tem, health workforce and the modality of service
delivery rapidly changed. It is noteworthy that the hu-
manitarian response was not specific to RMNCAH&N
but rather encompassed all health services. Those
services that rely on a stable health system, such as
immunization, suffered, and it took some time for the
humanitarian system to establish itself and achieve some
progress.
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Our findings suggest that the partial breakdown of
the healthcare system and the delay in humanitarian
coordination led – at certain times, and in certain
geographic locations – to gaps in intervention deliv-
ery and coverage along the continuum of care for
women, children and adolescents. This lag raises con-
cerns regarding the lack of emergency preparedness
in a wider region that has been particularly prone to
conflict. Resulting gaps within Syria varied by region
and time in this particularly heterogeneous setting, in
terms of political governance, functionality of health-
care systems, security, and accessibility. This led to
fluctuations in family planning services, newborn care,
IYCF programs and immunization coverage. Addition-
ally, a lack of focus on adolescent health was identi-
fied throughout the conflict.
The volatile security context led to i) population dis-
placement, thus interrupting the continuity of care for
concerned populations; ii) exodus of skilled health work-
force leading to a shortage of healthcare providers fol-
lowing recurrent attacks on healthcare facilities; iii)
enforcing sanctions on procurement of supplies [59] and
iv) restrictions on population movement, and thus access
to healthcare. These factors combined have affected
healthcare seeking behaviors, which is exemplified in the
case of delivery care, whereby Syrian women were re-
ported to prefer home births, or request C-sections to
mitigate the risks associated with the insecure environ-
ment, thus – combined with provider incentives – lead-
ing to increasing rates of facility-level C-sections.
This study also highlights that whereas maternal and
child health interventions were prioritised by
Fig. 5 C-section rate during the Syrian conflict in healthcare facilities [33], Dar Al-Tawlid Hospital [52], and at the population level [47, 53, 54] at
the population level pre-conflict [55]
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humanitarian actors from the very start of the crisis, the
delayed prioritisation of certain RMNCAH&N interven-
tions (such as those related to family planning and ado-
lescent health) has affected intervention coverage. This
is in line with findings of another study from inside
Syria, which found that the initial response prioritised
trauma care and infectious disease control [60]. Garry et
al. focused on non-communicable disease care provision
and found that priorities were donor-driven as opposed
to population needs-driven [60]. Our findings also illus-
trate that services not prioritised in Syria’s public health
system pre-conflict (e.g. family planning services) were
also not initially prioritised by humanitarian actors in
their RMNCAH&N programming. It is however interest-
ing to note that certain components of the health sys-
tem, such as communicable disease surveillance,
retained some level of functionality and enabled an in-
formed response to the detected outbreaks.
The humanitarian response mainly focused on invest-
ing in delivering care at primary healthcare facilities,
which is contrasted with how the population sought care
pre-conflict (e.g. with specialists at hospitals). Key infor-
mants reported that over time, the Syrian population
started to value the importance of health care services at
the primary healthcare level. These findings are in line
with those from the study focusing on the delivery of
non-communicable diseases care inside Syria [60]. The
Syrian population’s early resistance towards the less
medicalised care model offered by the humanitarian sys-
tem suggests that the latter should better align with the
pre-existing health system in a conflict-affected setting.
Doing so necessitates a rapid health system assessment
of the context before starting service delivery, and on-
going communication and coordination with local stake-
holders, which is a challenge in the Syrian context where
political instability restricts humanitarian actors’ opera-
tions and movements [61].
The fragmentation of governance on the Syrian terri-
tory among multiple authorities led to a multi-hub re-
sponse [6] that is unique to Syria. While this complex
humanitarian architecture has implications on the mo-
dality of service delivery, and therefore coverage, it al-
lows the successful provision of RMNCAH&N
interventions in a context with fragmented governance.
Despite the reported challenge regarding fluctuations in
border crossings, the adopted remote management strat-
egy has permitted humanitarian agencies to expand their
reach, and serve populations in need of healthcare in
often inaccessible areas [61]. Similarly, the newly intro-
duced modality of service delivery entails an increased
emphasis on outreach activities through community
health workers providing health education, home visits
and health screening. This approach was not part of Syr-
ia’s pre-conflict health system, and has positively
influenced RMNCAH&N service delivery, and poten-
tially the coverage of such interventions.
Acknowledging that remote management was consid-
ered to be a key operational solution, we identified po-
tential limitations of this modality in ensuring coverage
and quality, which should be taken into consideration in
the adoption of a similar modality. These were largely
related to the lack of robust accountability and monitor-
ing mechanisms, which hinders the assessment of the
quality of delivered interventions and the validity of col-
lected data [62]. This deficiency in accountability was re-
ported to be one among several constraining factors (e.g.
measurement difficulties) that have prevented the estab-
lishment of a maternal mortality surveillance, leading to
a knowledge gap in the Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR)
indicator in Syria during the conflict. Other gaps in
RMNCAH&N indicators were also documented through
our current desk review, which are consistent with the
findings of our earlier study [24]. Although we could re-
trieve data on the regional variation in immunization
coverage and C-section rates, we are not able to present
geographical disparities on other RMNCAH&N indica-
tors due to the above-documented data gaps and their
underlying causes.
Our analyses also highlight the lack of representative
data at all levels (i.e. national, governorate and sub-
governorates levels) as well as reliable population-level
data, and pre-conflict benchmarks for certain indicators
(e.g. facility-level C-section rate), in line with other stud-
ies [6, 24]. We relied on published data sources due to
our inability to obtain raw data from various sources (in-
cluding, for example, HeRAMS). This limits the repre-
sentativeness of the analyses, particularly as data sources
such as HeRAMS include data only from public health-
care facilities and may also suffer from incomplete
reporting [33]. Vaccination data that was used also relies
on published sources that have evaluated the quality of
data as low [48].
Strengths and limitations
The strengths of this study lie in its methodological ap-
proach, which used triangulation and validation across
qualitative and quantitative data to better describe the
factors that influenced RMNCAH&N intervention
coverage in the Syrian context where data quality and
quantity are limited. Furthermore, this research was con-
ducted by a team the majority of whom are based in a
neighboring country and thus are familiar with the con-
text. However, our study was limited by the difficulties
of the Syrian context. We had restricted access to Syrian
governmental authorities or representatives from local
NGOs in Damascus. Thus, although UN informants re-
ported on the MoH collaboration and efforts, we may
not have provided a comprehensive picture of services
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provided by this entity. We were also unable to interview
first-line healthcare providers due to the interviews be-
ing conducted remotely. In addition, we faced reluctance
from some organisations/individuals to communicate
with the research team, possibly due to changes in polit-
ical control of different territories occurring during the
study period (which continue to occur). Finally, we were
not able to compare the response between the geo-
graphic areas controlled by different entities due to the
paucity of RMNCAH&N indicators and interventions
data at the governorate and/or sub-governorate levels.
Conclusions
The case of Syria provides a unique perspective on cre-
ative ways of managing humanitarian interventions in
order to serve populations in need, in a dynamic and
often volatile political and security environment. Adapta-
tions made to the humanitarian architecture in the man-
agement of the response to the Syrian crisis, specifically
the adoption of remote management, can offer potential
solutions to manage and deliver RMNCAH&N services
in similar conflict-affected settings. Despite operational,
human resource, and funding challenges, humanitarian
actors were able to prioritise services for maternal and
child health (albeit a lagged response); however, a glaring
gap remains in the delivery of adolescent health-related
services. Furthermore, the scarcity and sensitivity of
RMNCAH&N data in the Syrian context has been a tre-
mendous challenge for both researchers and implement-
ing agencies, and these data are needed to hold
humanitarian actors to account, with an ultimate aim of
improving the health of women, children and adoles-
cents in Syria.
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